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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On one level antidiscrimination law is necessarily all about values.  It 
is about which kinds of discrimination society is committed to 
eradicating and which kinds it is content to let continue.  Society 
prohibits discrimination against women but not people born in August, 
not because the former is more irrational than the latter, but because 
society cares more about ensuring women’s social participation than that 
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of those born in August.  Certainly the social pervasiveness of discrimination 
is an important part of this determination.  Irrational but idiosyncratic 
discrimination is less harmful, both to individuals and socially salient 
groups, than irrational and systemic discrimination.  It therefore warrants 
fewer social expenditures.  Pervasiveness alone, however, does not explain 
antidiscrimination protection.  The overweight and unattractive face systemic 
and often irrational discrimination but receive no federal antidiscrimination 
protection.1  On a most basic level, antidiscrimination law is about 
which groups are deemed worthy of social admission and protection and 
which are not. 
Yet, I argue in this paper that antidiscrimination law in practice is also 
about a more controversial and covert set of values—one focused on 
promoting certain kinds of individual development, rather than 
undermining group hierarchy, and driven by conceptions of individual 
rather than group worth.  Antidiscrimination law’s scope, at least at the 
margins, reflects perfectionist judicial conceptions of human flourishing.  
Courts use antidiscrimination law’s carrot of inclusion and stick of 
exclusion to encourage those traits and attributes they deem important 
for a good human life and to discourage those they deem harmful or 
worthless. 
Current Title VII case law reveals the critical role that both sets of 
values play in defining the actual scope and shape of antidiscrimination 
protection.  At the most basic level, Title VII prohibits discrimination in 
employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, and national 
origin.2  The statute embodies society’s core liberal antidiscrimination 
 1. See Robert J. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful.  Well, Why Not?, BUS. 
WEEK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 18 (noting that the “wage differential between attractive and 
ugly people is about 10% for both sexes”); T.L. Brink, Obesity and Job Discrimination: 
Mediation Via Personality Stereotypes?, 66 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 494 (1988) 
(showing in a laboratory setting that weight had more significant negative effects on 
participants’ ratings of potential employees than age, race, or sex); Daniel S. Hamermesh 
& Jeff E. Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1174, 1192 (1994) 
(For both women and men “wages of people with below-average looks are lower than 
those of average-looking workers; and there is a premium in wages for good-looking 
people . . . .”); Regina Pingitore et al., Bias Against Overweight Job Applicants in a 
Simulated Employment Interview, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909 (1994) (studying effects 
of weight and sex on hiring decisions); Mark V. Roehling, Weight-Based Discrimination 
in Employment: Psychological and Legal Aspects, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 969 (1999) 
(reviewing twenty-nine studies showing discrimination against the obese in hiring, 
wages and benefits).  
 2. Title VII provides:  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
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commitments to status blindness and antisubordination through the 
undermining of traditional caste-based hierarchies.3  The Act’s disparate 
treatment framework demands the former.4  Women and men—or blacks 
and whites—must be subject to the same set of hiring and employment 
requirements.  Similarly qualified applicants cannot be treated differently 
because of their sex or race.5  The Act’s disparate impact doctrine 
demands the latter.6  Employers are prohibited from treating women and 
men—or blacks and whites—who are in fact different, differently if 
 3. Both goals are prominent in the Act’s legislative history.  Statements made on 
the floor of the House by supporters of the sex discrimination amendment to Title VII 
made clear that they intended the prohibition to end the blanket exclusion of women 
from jobs and to dismantle the sex-based hierarchy of the work world that such exclusion 
maintained.  Representative Martha Griffiths, for example, argued that without including 
protections for sex in the Act, women would continue to populate lower paid jobs and be 
excluded from better jobs reserved for men.  See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-84 (1964), 
reprinted in U.S. EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
ACT OF 1964, at 3213-19 (1968).  Similarly, Representative St. George argued in favor of 
the amendment as a way to challenge restrictive protective labor laws that prevented 
“women from going into the higher salary brackets.”  Id. at 3221.  St. George explained: 
“Women are protected—they cannot run an elevator late at night and that is when the 
pay is higher.  They cannot serve in restaurants and cabarets late at night—when the tips 
are higher—and the load . . . is lighter.”  Id.
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 5. To be sure, the disparate treatment framework has significant antisubordination 
effects, but such effects are not required for its application.  Title VII’s disparate 
treatment doctrine demands status-blind treatment for dominant group members—such 
as men or whites—even though such protection is not necessary to undermine traditional 
forms of status group hierarchy.  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ 
protects men as well as women . . . .”) (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 
U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976) (“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . prohibits the 
discharge of ‘any individual’ because of ‘such individual’s race’ . . . .  Its terms are not 
limited to discrimination against members of any particular race.”) (internal citation and 
footnote omitted). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established 
under this subchapter only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity . . . . 
Id. 




doing so will reinforce traditional status hierarchies and the treatment is 
not justified by business necessity.7
Title VII is often thought of as a paradigmatic liberal antidiscrimination 
statute.8  Scholars often contrast its antidiscrimination demands with the 
explicit accommodationist demands of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) which require employers to absorb reasonable costs in hiring 
individuals who can effectively perform jobs with, but not without, 
additional inputs.9  The significant accommodationist costs Title VII 
 7. Historically, courts have conceived of the disparate impact cause of 
action as antisubordination-oriented, one available to racial minorities or women but not 
to whites or men.  See Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (affirming dismissal of disparate impact case brought on behalf of men on 
grounds that “a neutral practice that has an adverse impact on a favored class simply 
cannot operate ‘to “freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices’ 
within the meaning of Griggs,” and, therefore, such suits are not permissible under Title 
VII absent some “background circumstances supporting the inference that a facially 
neutral policy with a disparate impact is in fact a vehicle for unlawful discrimination”) 
(quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)); see also John J. 
Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated 
Benefits for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897, 898 (2001) (“[A] neutral 
employment practice that disadvantages white men yet has no business justification is 
permissible, while the same practice would be unlawful if it were to disadvantage 
women or minorities.”).  With the increasing anticlassificationist focus of statutory and 
constitutional antidiscrimination law, however, there is a chance that disparate impact 
doctrine will in fact come to be applied in a status-blind way without regard to larger 
issues of social group hierarchy and subordination.  See Charles A. Sullivan, The World 
Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 
1505, 1512 (2004) (concluding that “[a]pplying disparate impact beyond minorities and 
women is profoundly ahistorical and inconsistent with the theoretic underpinnings of the 
theory,” but nonetheless that “limiting disparate impact to minorities and women cannot 
survive equal protection analysis”).
 8. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, 
and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 827 (2003) (describing the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 as “the canonical employment discrimination statute”); Carlos 
A. Ball, Looking for Theory in All the Right Places: Feminist and Communitarian Elements of 
Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 168 (2005) (describing as paradigmatic 
the intentional forms of race and sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII); Christine 
Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 643 (2001) (“The 
canonical idea of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the differential 
treatment of otherwise similarly situated individuals on the basis of race, sex, national 
origin, or other protected characteristics.”); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, 
Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
579 (2004) (describing Title VII as embodying “traditional antidiscrimination norms”). 
 9. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Forward—Backlash Against the ADA: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3-4 (2000)). 
The ADA incorporated a profoundly different model of equality from that 
associated with traditional non-discrimination statutes like Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. . . . The ADA required not only that disabled 
individuals be treated no worse than non-disabled individuals with whom they 
were similarly situated, but also directed that in certain contexts they be treated 
differently, arguably better, to achieve an equal effect.
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itself imposes on employers are often overlooked or minimized.10  
Employers are regularly required by Title VII to hire people with whom 
their customers or other employees do not want to work.  Employers are 
also, at times, required to reshape jobs and business plans to include 
workers who would otherwise be left out.  In other words, Title VII 
sometimes requires employers to change social preferences and sometimes 
requires them to change job requirements in order to include protected 
group members.  Both requirements are costly for employers, and thus 
are not lightly imposed by courts unless important values are at stake.  
Such values, I argue, are both traditionally liberal and perfectionist. 
This paper focuses on two muddled and contested areas of sex 
discrimination case law—the first deals with sexuality and the second 
with gender nonconformity in the workplace.  Both are areas in which 
courts, at times, impose significant accommodationist demands on 
employers in the name of Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate.  
Section II addresses cases in which employers attempt to discriminate on 
Id.  For other scholarly work in this vein, see for example Miranda Oshige McGowan, 
Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 35 (2000) (“[T]he 
ADA appears to make a revolutionary break with the old ways of thinking about 
discrimination while charting a new course of affirmative obligations to ensure real 
equality.”); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the 
Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 353 (2001) (“Many courts are troubled by 
[the] contradiction between the traditional civil rights label given the ADA and the 
affirmative action obligation imposed by the Act which vastly exceeds the traditional 
nondiscrimination mandate of the civil rights laws the ADA purports to emulate.”); J.H. 
Verkerke, Disaggregating Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1385, 1387 (2003) (“[T]he categories of antidiscrimination and accommodation 
draw a meaningful distinction between alternative strategies for defining and remedying 
employment discrimination and that the ADA’s accommodation provisions differ in 
important ways from preexisting law.”). 
 10. Recently, however, several scholars have been drawing attention to these costs.  
See Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 830 (“[T]he ADA’s accommodation requirement is 
fundamentally of a piece with the core antidiscrimination requirements of Title VII . . . .”); 
Stein, supra note 8, at 617 (“Contrary to the canonical view of traditional antidiscrimination 
measures, applying the remedies provided by Title VII and other traditional regulations 
always engenders cost to employers because civil rights laws challenge, and when 
necessary amend, discriminatory workplace norms.”); see also Jolls, supra note 8, at 
643-45: 
[O]bservers sharply contrast Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
other older civil rights enactments, which are said to be “real anti-
discrimination law[s],” with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), said to be 
“accommodation” laws. . . .  [However,] in a broader respect than has generally 
been appreciated, some aspects of antidiscrimination law—in particular its 
disparate impact branch—are in fact requirements of accommodation. 




the basis of sex in order to protect customers’ personal or sexual privacy 
or to provide customers with a particular kind of sexual titillation.  As a 
general matter, courts permit discrimination in the first type of case—
imposing no accomodationist demands on employers, while prohibiting 
discrimination in the latter—imposing significant accommodationist 
demands.  Section III addresses claims by gender nonconforming women 
and men that Title VII protects them from disadvantage in the workplace.  
In such cases courts require employers to hire some, but not all, gender 
nonconforming individuals despite discomfort from coworkers and 
customers, thereby imposing significant accommodationist costs on 
employers in the instances in which discrimination is prohibited. 
I contend that the antidiscrimination demands imposed on employers 
in these areas cannot be fully understood and explained by resort to Title 
VII’s core liberal commitments, but instead reflect underlying and 
implicit judicial conceptions of human flourishing.  These judicial 
conceptions of human flourishing need not be deliberate, nor even 
conscious, but a recognition of their presence is necessary to explain, or 
render intelligible, the current state of sex discrimination caselaw.11  
In other words, at least at the margins, the scope of Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination protection is driven by judicial judgments about what 
kinds of people, with what kinds of traits and attributes, are valuable 
enough to be worth the costs of inclusion.  Before turning to an analysis 
of the case law, I begin by discussing briefly the concepts that are 
critical to my analysis. 
II.  DEFINING CONCEPTS 
Liberalism protects individual rights and demands social agnosticism 
toward what people do with these rights and how they choose to live 
their lives.  It is, in other words, rights-based and value-neutral toward 
competing conceptions of the good.12  Title VII, on its face, is a classic 
piece of liberal legislation. 
 11. To use Professor Rosati’s language, my purpose is primarily to rationalize 
courts’ sex discrimination decisions by providing a framework in which to fit them.  
However, as Professor Rosati suggests, my claims are somewhat broader than this.  I do 
believe that judges’ conceptions of human flourishing influence and hence cause to some 
degree their decisions in the hard cases, though I do not pretend this is a conscious causal 
story.  Moreover, I am sympathetic to the perfectionist ideals underlying some of the sex 
discrimination case law, though the case law is muddled and inconsistent, and I certainly 
do not subscribe to all of the seemingly underlying ideals.  My purpose in this paper is to 
offer a more complete theory of antidiscrimination law by pointing out the role that 
perfectionist ideals necessarily play in structuring its meaning and impact. 
 12. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN 
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 4 (1996) (“The political philosophy by which we live 
is a certain version of liberal political theory.  Its central idea is that government should 
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Title VII guarantees protected group members status-blind treatment 
in the work world.13  Women and men—and blacks and whites—who 
are similar in their interests and abilities must face similar treatment in 
the work world.  The Act guarantees access and opportunity.  It is agnostic, 
however, as to whether women—or blacks—actually take advantage of 
these rights.  Title VII requires that women can be doctors, not that they 
must be.14
The Act’s antisubordination goals, while group-focused, are also 
decidedly liberal.  The Act seeks to undermine traditional caste hierarchies 
and increase the integration and participation of protected group 
members by invalidating business practices that disproportionately 
exclude protected group members for reasons unrelated to business 
necessity.15  The goal is to increase the numbers of women and blacks in 
the work force, particularly at the higher levels.16  It does not matter 
from an antisubordination perspective, however, whether the women 
who achieve promotion are disproportionately those without children or 
family responsibilities as opposed to those with such caretaking obligations.  
Nor does it matter if the blacks who achieve success are disproportionately 
middle class and culturally assimilated rather than poor and from racially 
segregated inner city neighborhoods.17  Title VII’s antisubordination 
concerns are bottom line oriented, remaining agnostic about which kinds 
of individuals within groups are rewarded. 
Perfectionism, in contrast, endorses a substantive conception of human 
flourishing.  As Andrew Koppelman has defined it, perfectionism is “the 
view that some ways of life are intrinsically better than others, and that 
the state may appropriately act to promote these better ways of life.”18  
be neutral toward the moral and religious views its citizens espouse.”); KIMBERLY A. 
YURACKO, PERFECTIONISM AND CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST VALUES 4 (2003) (“Liberalism 
is a theory based on individual rights and social agnosticism toward what people do with 
these rights.”). 
 13. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text. 
 14. For an interesting account of how courts actually respond to employers’ claims 
that women are simply uninterested in certain jobs see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories 
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in 
Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990). 
 15. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
 16. See supra note 3. 
 17. Richard Ford essentially makes this form of liberal antisubordination argument 
when arguing against expanding Title VII’s protection to include discrimination based 
on racially and culturally associated traits.  See RICHARD T. FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A 
CRITIQUE (2005). 
 18. Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633, 634 (2004). 




Perfectionist theories divide into those arguing that certain activities and 
traits are inherently valuable—valuable in light of human nature—and 
those arguing that certain activities and traits are intrinsically valuable—
valuable regardless of human nature.19
Thomas Hurka, George Sher, and Martha Nussbaum all offer inherent 
perfectionist theories.  Hurka, for example, starts from the premise that a 
good human life is one which develops “human nature” to a “high 
degree.”20  Hurka equates human nature “with the properties essential to 
humans and conditioned on their being living things”21 and identifies 
physical perfection, theoretical rationality, and practical rationality as the 
goals of a good human life.22  Sher also contends that human flourishing 
comes from the development of fundamental human capacities.  He determines 
which capacities are fundamental by asking which characteristics are nearly 
universal and nearly inescapable for all persons.  He then sets out to 
discover the telos of these capacities—the end toward which they aim.23  
Like the other theorists, Martha Nussbaum’s perfectionism focuses on 
essential forms of human functioning and the capacities necessary for 
such functioning.24  However, instead of arguing that the good life 
requires that individuals develop and exercise these capacities to their 
fullest, Nussbaum contends that a good human life is one in which the 
individual has the capacity for various forms of essential human 
functioning, regardless of whether she necessarily utilizes these 
capacities.25
Joseph Raz, in contrast, offers an intrinsic perfectionism.  His 
perfectionism derives not from a theory of human nature or essence but 
from a belief in the intrinsic value of autonomy.26  For Raz human 
flourishing requires that individuals possess the capacities and conditions 
 19. GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS 9 (1997).  
Vinit Haksar describes these views as weak and strong perfectionism, respectively.  
VINIT HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY AND PERFECTIONISM (1979).  According to Haksar, 
weak perfectionism asserts that some forms of human life are superior to others because 
they “are more suited to human beings.”  Id. at 3.  In contrast, strong perfectionism says 
there are x’s and y’s such that “whatever human nature turns out to be . . . it would still 
be the case that x would be intrinsically superior to y.”  Id. at 3-4. 
 20. THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM 3 (1993). 
 21. Id. at 17. 
 22. Id. at 37. 
 23. SHER, supra note 19, at 202. 
 24. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, in 
WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 83-85 
(Martha Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Human 
Capabilities]; Martha Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on 
Political Distribution, in OXFORD STUDIES IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY 160-64 (Supp. 1 
1988) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Nature, Function and Capability]. 
 25. See Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra note 24, at 94-95. 
 26. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 390-95 (1986). 
YURACKO_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC_POST AUTHOR EDIT 2/26/2007  11:43:27 AM 
[VOL. 43:  857, 2006]  Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 865 
 
for an autonomous life because autonomy is good in itself.27  In fact, 
Raz’s perfectionism requires not only that individuals live autonomously 
but that they direct their lives toward valuable ends.28  Raz is vague, 
however, about what constitutes valuable autonomy.29
Despite their different points of origin, these contemporary perfectionist 
theorists converge on a shared commitment to the importance of 
intellectual and rational development for a meaningful human life.  For 
Nussbaum such development must be only to the degree necessary to 
allow one to form and act upon one’s own life plans and projects, while 
for Hurka, Raz, and Sher such development must be to some higher, if 
not the highest possible, degree.30  Nonetheless, all human flourishing 
requires attention to and development of individuals’ intellectual 
capacities. 
Several theorists also stress the importance for human flourishing of 
certain kinds of sexual and intimate expression.  Nussbaum argues that 
human flourishing requires that individuals be able to make “personal 
and self-defining choices,” such as those regarding sexual expression, 
without undue interference.31  Raz and Sher both stress the importance 
of particularly valuable kinds of intimate personal relationships.  For 
Sher such relationships are caring and nonmanipulative,32 while for 
Raz such relationships are nonmonetized, requiring individuals to treat 
 27. Id. at 368-73. 
 28. Id. at 381. 
 29. Id. at 390-95. 
 30. For Nussbaum, human flourishing requires that individuals have the cognitive 
and intellectual capacities necessary to be able to plan and direct a course for their lives.  
See Nussbaum, Nature, Function, and Capability, supra note 24, at 160-61.  For Hurka 
human flourishing requires the development and exercise of humans’ capacities to form 
and act on sophisticated beliefs.  HURKA, supra note 20, at 41.  Likewise for Raz autonomy 
requires that an individual possess the mental abilities necessary to form intentions, 
develop complex plans, and connect means with their probable ends.  See RAZ, supra 
note 26, at 372-73.  For Sher human flourishing requires the development of individuals’ 
capacities for reason and knowledge to their highest degree.  SHER, supra note 19, at 
203. 
 31. See Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, supra note 24, at 83-85. 
 32. For Sher human flourishing requires social interaction aimed at mutual respect 
and recognition.  See SHER, supra note 19, at 206-07.  Sher contends that friendships or 
romantic relationships between people who care for and respect each other are far more 
successful at achieving mutual recognition than are “interpersonal relations that are (e.g.) 
manipulative, exploitative, coercive, or destructive.”  Id. at 205-07. 




themselves, others, and their relationships as incommensurable and 
noncommodifiable.33
Margaret Jane Radin, who offers a more narrowly circumscribed 
perfectionist theory, also emphasizes the importance for human flourishing 
of noncommodified conceptions of sexuality.  “[T]o see the rhetoric of 
the market—the rhetoric of fungibility, alienability, and cost-benefit 
analysis—as the sole rhetoric of human affairs is to foster an inferior 
conception of human flourishing,” Radin argues.34  To understand sexuality 
and certain other aspects of ourselves, “as monetizable or completely 
detachable from the person . . . is to do violence to our deepest understanding 
of what it is to be human.”35
In the following sections I show that courts’ antidiscrimination mandates 
cannot be fully explained and understood in purely liberal terms, but 
instead reflect underlying perfectionist ideals.  Moreover, I demonstrate 
that these ideals map in large part onto the dominant commitments to 
intellectual and rational development and valued sexual expression of 
contemporary perfectionist theory. 
III.  SEXUALITY AT WORK 
Issues related to sexuality at work arise in two types of Title VII sex 
discrimination cases.  First, employers sometimes seek to discriminate 
on the basis of sex in order to protect customers’ personal and sexual 
privacy.  Second, employers sometimes seek to discriminate on the basis 
of sex in order to provide customers with a particular kind of sexual 
titillation.  In some sense, these cases are the flip side of each other.  In 
the first set of cases employers seek to discriminate to satisfy customers’ 
desires to shield their bodies and sexuality from exposure.  In the second 
set of cases employers seek to discriminate to satisfy customers’ desire 
to purchase sexuality.  In both sets of cases, employers contend that sex-
based hiring is necessary and justified by the bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination.36  While employers are generally successful in the first 
 33. Raz contends that certain valuable social forms, like intimate personal 
relations, can only exist if people recognize that the social relations are incommensurable 
with other kinds of market goods.  See RAZ, supra note 26, at 347-53. 
 34. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885-86 
(1987). 
 35. Id. at 1905-06. 
 36. The BFOQ exception provides: 
   Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, 
for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, 
for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for 
YURACKO_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC_POST AUTHOR EDIT 2/26/2007  11:43:27 AM 
[VOL. 43:  857, 2006]  Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 867 
 
type of cases, they are generally unsuccessful in the latter, at least when 
the employer seeks to sell sex along with other nonsexual goods and 
services.  In this section I show that courts’ treatment of sexuality in 
both types of cases cannot be explained by Title VII’s core liberal 
commitments but is instead motivated by judicial commitments to 
intellectual and rational development and noncommodified sexual 
expression. 
Privacy cases raising antidiscrimination claims fall along a continuum 
measured by degrees of physical and visual contact.  At one end of the 
spectrum are the strongest BFOQ claims, those most likely to succeed.  
These claims typically involve jobs requiring actual physical contact 
with or inspection of others’ naked bodies.  Courts have upheld sex 
discrimination in such situations based on the intimate nature of the 
services being provided.  For example, courts have allowed sex 
discrimination in hiring labor-room nurses, personal caregivers, nurses’ 
aides, and certain other types of hospital staff.37  
employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on 
the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).  Under the terms of the statute, race never constitutes a 
BFOQ.  See id. 
 37. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 
1996) (permitting sex to be a BFOQ for psychiatric hospital staff treating emotionally 
disturbed and sexually abused children and adolescents because “[c]hild patients often 
[had to be] accompanied to the bathroom, and sometimes . . . bathed.”); Jones v. Hinds 
Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (“The job duties of male and 
female nurse assistants and male orderlies often require that such employee view or 
touch the private parts of their patients.”); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-
1374-W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (holding sex to be a BFOQ for 
nurses in hospital labor and delivery rooms); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 
1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (same), vacated by 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding issue 
moot); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352-53 (D. Del. 1978) 
(“The Home has the responsibility of providing twenty-four hour supervision and care of 
its elderly guests.  Fulfillment of that responsibility necessitates intimate personal care 
including dressing, bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes and catheter care.  
Each of these functions involves a personal touching . . . .”).  But see Olsen v. Marriott 
Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding impermissible the consideration 
of sex in hiring of massage therapists).  In Olsen, Marriott’s customers overwhelmingly 
requested female therapists.  Id. at 1063.  Although the court noted that massage 
generally involved a naked customer covered by a sheet or towel and being touched in 
“intimate areas such as abdominals, inner thighs, and, with [customer’s] permission, 




The middle of the BFOQ privacy continuum involves jobs that require 
an employee to see—but not touch—patients or customers in various 
states of undress.  In these situations, courts have generally upheld sex 
discrimination in hiring based on a similar intimacy rationale.38
The far end of the privacy continuum is composed of cases in which an 
employee’s duties might cause a client or coworker embarrassment or 
discomfort when performed by an individual of the opposite sex, but the 
duties do not necessarily involve touching or seeing a client’s or 
coworker’s naked body.  These are the weakest BFOQ cases, though 
they are still sometimes successful.39
In sum, courts are generally quite permissive toward sex discrimination in 
privacy cases.  Such permissiveness, however, is inexplicable from a 
purely doctrinal perspective.  Sex-based hiring in even the strongest 
privacy cases—those involving physical contact with a customer’s naked 
body—directly violates Title VII’s requirement of status blindness.  Just 
as male doctors are as competent as female doctors to act as obstetricians 
and gynecologists, male nurses are just as physically and technically 
competent to act as labor and delivery room nurses as female nurses.  
Likewise, just as male doctors are as competent as female doctors to care 
for elderly women, male personal assistants are as capable of providing 
caregiving services to elderly women as are female assistants. 
Nonetheless, courts permit such discrimination by relying on Title 
VII’s BFOQ exception.  The BFOQ exception permits employers to 
discriminate on the basis of sex if sex is a “bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise . . . .”40  As courts explain, the BFOQ 
buttocks,” the court held that the privacy interests raised by massage did not justify the 
Marriott’s sex-based hiring of massage therapists.  Id. at 1070-74.
 38. See, e.g., Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 
381-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (permitting sex to be a BFOQ for staffing of treatment assistants 
at a state-run psychiatric hospital because the positions sometimes necessitated that the 
treatment assistants view patients naked or partially undressed); Brooks v. ACF Indus., 
537 F. Supp. 1122, 1125, 1133 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (holding sex was a BFOQ for 
cleaning men’s bathhouses at a railroad car plant because of the likelihood that male 
workers would be viewed in various states of undress by the janitor cleaning the 
bathhouse). 
 39. Compare Norwood v. Dale Maint. Syst., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1416-17 (N.D. Ill. 
1984) (holding that sex was a BFOQ for staffing attendants who cleaned single-sex 
restrooms in a large office building, not because office workers might be seen naked by 
someone of the opposite sex, but because they would feel “embarrassment” and 
“increased stress” from being expected to use washrooms in the presence of someone of 
the opposite sex), with EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301, 303-05 (W.D. Mo. 1996) 
(holding that sex was not a BFOQ in the hiring of weight-loss counselors, even though 
the employer’s predominantly female clientele was uncomfortable with male counselors 
taking their body fat measurements either on bare skin or through clothing). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). 
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exception permits discrimination when it is necessary to preserve the 
“essence of the business” in a particular case.41
The BFOQ exception cannot, however, adequately explain courts’ 
permissiveness toward sex-based hiring in these cases.  Discrimination 
would only be necessary to preserve the essence of the business in these 
privacy cases if business essence itself were defined wholly in terms of 
customer preferences.  Yet, the regulations and case law interpreting the 
BFOQ exception make clear that such preferences cannot justify sex-
based hiring.42
While doctrine does not well explain courts’ privacy decisions, 
perfectionism does.  Indeed, courts’ perfectionism is quite explicit in these 
cases.  Courts permit discrimination in these cases because of their belief 
that human dignity and flourishing is tied to one’s ability to shield one’s 
body and sexuality from unwanted and forced exposure.  For example, 
in Local 567, American Federation of State, County, & Municipal 
Employees v. Michigan Council 25,43 the district court held that the need 
to provide personal hygiene care for patients could justify sex-based 
 41. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (stating that sex 
discrimination “‘is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be 
undermined . . . .’” if the business eliminated its discriminatory policy) (quoting Diaz v. 
Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)); see also UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991) (holding that sex discrimination is permissible 
under the BFOQ exception only if those aspects of a job that allegedly require 
discrimination fall within the “‘essence’ of the particular business.”); Healey v. 
Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996) (same); Fesel v. Masonic 
Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (D. Del. 1978) (same). 
 42. The regulations interpreting the BFOQ exception provide: 
The Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the 
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception: . . . 
. . . 
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, 
the employer, clients or customers except . . . . 
[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness . . . e.g., 
an actor or actress. 
29 C.F.R. §1604.2(a)(1) (2005); see also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 
1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting employer’s argument that sex-based hiring for the 
position of Vice President of International Operations was justified because Latin 
American clients would react negatively to a woman in that position); Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that sex based hiring of 
flight attendants was not justified by customers’ preference for women in these 
positions). 
 43. 635 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 




hiring of workers at state mental healthcare institutions.44  In reaching its 
conclusion, the court explained: “We cannot conceive of a more basic 
subject of privacy than the naked body.  The desire to shield ‘one’s 
unclothed figure from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the 
opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal 
dignity.’”45
The Ninth Circuit expressed similar sentiments in Michenfelder v. 
Sumner.46  A prisoner in a maximum-security facility sued Nevada state 
prison officials, alleging that their policy of conducting strip searches 
and otherwise exposing unclothed male inmates to view by female 
guards and visitors violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.47  The 
court found no constitutional violation because female officers were not 
routinely present for strip searches of male prisoners and because 
visitors were not able to view such searches.48  It noted, however, that 
prisoners “retain a limited right to bodily privacy”49 and that such 
preferences were directly linked to individuals’ “self-respect and 
personal dignity.”50
Several courts have explained their decision to permit sex-based hiring 
in privacy cases by simply quoting the Larson & Larson employment 
discrimination treatise: “[G]iving respect to deep-seated feelings of 
personal privacy involving one’s own genital areas is quite a different 
matter from catering to the desire of some male airline passengers to 
experience the hovering presence of . . . an attractive female flight 
attendant.”51  For these courts, customer preferences to shield their 
 44. The court made clear, though, that whether sex-based hiring was actually 
permissible in that case depended on the state’s ability to show that there were no 
reasonable alternatives by which the state could protect patients’ privacy interests 
without engaging in sex-based hiring.  See id. at 1014.
 45. Id. at 1013 (quoting York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)).  The 
court went on to emphasize the connection between personal dignity and the preference 
for personal physical privacy: “Obviously most people would find it a greater intrusion 
of their dignity and privacy to have their naked bodies viewed (or any number of 
personal services performed) by a member of the opposite sex.”  Id. at 1013-14. 
 46. 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 47. Id. at 329-34.
 48. See id. at 334.  Contra Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(en banc) (holding that a policy at a women’s prison permitting random cross-gender 
clothed-body searches of female inmates constituted cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment). 
 49. Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333. 
 50. See id. 
 51. LEX K. LARSON & ARTHUR LARSON, 3 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 
43.02[3][b], at 43-8 (2d. ed., rev. 73, 2006); see also Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., No. 
98 CIV. 7455(VM), 2000 WL 1400965, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) (quoting the 
corresponding passage from a prior edition of LARSON & LARSON); Backus v. Baptist 
Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. at 1191, 1194-95 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (same), vacated by 671 F.2d 
1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding issue moot). 
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bodies and sexuality from exposure are simply different and more 
valuable than other types of customer preferences, in particular those for 
commodified sexuality.   
The perfectionist ideal underlying and driving courts’ permissiveness 
toward discrimination in the privacy cases is one focused on the value 
and importance of protecting personal and sexual autonomy, particularly 
from forced exposure.  Courts do not require that women or men shield 
their bodies and sexuality from exposure to the opposite sex; rather, they 
are vigilant in ensuring that women and men who choose to do so should 
be so permitted.52
The flip side of the privacy cases is the sexual titillation cases in 
which employers seek to discriminate on the basis of sex in order to 
provide customers with a desired form of sexual titillation.  These 
employers also raise the BFOQ defense to justify their discrimination.  
While courts accept such BFOQ defenses from employers that sell 
virtually nothing but sex, they refuse to accept it from employers that 
sell sex along with other goods and services.  I refer to businesses of the 
first type as sex businesses and businesses of the second type as plus-sex 
businesses.53  As before, courts’ rulings in these cases simply cannot be 
explained by Title VII’s core doctrinal requirements of status blindness and 
antisubordination.  While it was courts’ permissiveness toward discrimination 
in the privacy cases that revealed their perfectionism, it is their 
impermissiveness toward discrimination in these cases that is so 
revealing. 
Sexual titillation-based BFOQ cases can also be thought of as falling 
along a continuum.  At one end are cases involving jobs in which a 
particular body is needed and used physically for the sexual gratification 
 52. This concern with protecting personal autonomy over one’s body and sexuality 
explains why courts protect women’s preferences in these cases even when they appear 
to be illogical or based on socially harmful stereotypes regarding appropriate gender 
roles.  For instance, courts respect women’s preferences to be cared for only by female 
obstetrics and gynecology nurses and thus permit hospitals to discriminate on the basis 
of sex in hiring such nurses, even when the same women are having their babies 
delivered by male doctors.  See EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80-1374-W, 1982 
WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982); Backus, 510 F. Supp. at 1193.  Similarly, courts 
respect elderly women’s preferences to be served only by female nurses even when the 
same women are simultaneously being cared for by male doctors.  See Fesel v. Masonic 
Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978). 
 53. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining 
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (examining cases in this 
area and adopting this terminology). 




of another person.  Prostitution and, arguably, lap dancing rest at this 
end of the sexual titillation continuum.  Though I know of no challenges 
to the sex-based hiring of prostitutes (where legal) or lap dancers by 
businesses that employ such workers, it seems likely that courts would 
permit such sex-based hiring as a BFOQ. 
The middle of the sexual titillation continuum consists of cases in 
which the good for sale is not the use of another’s body for sexual 
gratification but the use of another person as a sexual gaze object.  As in 
the cases described above, sexual titillation is the exclusive good for 
sale, but the means of arousal differs.  Cases involving the sex-based 
hiring of strippers and Playboy centerfolds fall into this category.  
Again, courts and commentators have assumed that sex is a BFOQ for 
these positions.54  I refer to business of both sorts as sex businesses. 
The other end of the sexual titillation continuum consists of cases in 
which employers seek to sell sexual arousal, generally through the 
provision of gaze objects along with some other nonsexual good or 
service.  In these “plus-sex businesses,” the nonsexual good or service 
being sold can be anything from food to safe air transport.  Attempts to 
discriminate on the basis of sex in hiring for plus-sex businesses are 
virtually always unsuccessful.55
The most famous plus-sex BFOQ case is Wilson v. Southwest 
Airlines.56  In 1971, Southwest, then a fledgling airline trying to carve 
out a market niche for itself, took the advice of an advertising agency 
 54. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 1981) 
(“[I]n jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service provided, e.g. 
a social escort or topless dancer, the job automatically calls for one sex exclusively . . . .”); 
LARSON & LARSON, supra note 51, § 43.03[1], at 43-24 (contending that sex is a BFOQ 
for hiring in businesses where the “distinctive product inherently includes a component of 
female sexiness”); Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 205 (1992) (noting that hiring 
only females as strippers is permissible). 
 55. See, e.g., Wilson, 517 F. Supp. 292 (prohibiting sex discrimination in hiring 
flight attendants and ticket agents).  Cf. Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (requiring a threshold showing 
of economic advantage to qualify for BFOQ exception).  An interesting exception to this 
rule was the hiring of Playboy Bunnies at Playboy Clubs.  Bunnies generally served 
customers food along with sexual eye candy.  Despite the plus-sex nature of the business, 
state adjudicatory bodies held that sex was a BFOQ for hiring Playboy Bunnies.  See St. 
Cross v. Playboy Club, Case No. CSF 22618-70, Appeal No. 773 (N.Y. State Div. of 
Human Rights, Dec. 17, 1971), available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/misc/aromi.pdf 
(quoting opinion in its entirety at *5-7) (last visited Aug. 20, 2006); Weber v. Playboy 
Club, Case No. CSF 22619-70, Appeal No. 774 (N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights Dec. 
17, 1971), available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/misc/aromi.pdf (quoting opinion in its 
entirety at *5-7) (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).  Hooters restaurants are perhaps the most 
obvious current example of a plus-sex business, though no court has ruled on Hooters’ 
policy of hiring only women as food servers, or “Hooters Girls.” 
 56. 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
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and decided to conceptualize and market itself as a company selling not 
only air travel but also heterosexual male titillation.57  In accordance 
with Southwest’s conceptualization of itself as the “love airline,” Southwest 
hired only women for the high-customer-contact positions of ticket agent 
and flight attendant.58  A class of male job applicants who were denied 
positions as a result of Southwest’s female-only hiring criteria sued the 
airline.59
Despite evidence that Southwest’s business had flourished during the 
“love airline” campaign, the district court rejected Southwest’s BFOQ 
defense, concluding that airlines were in the business of selling safe 
transport and not sexual titillation.60  “Like any other airline,” the court 
ruled, “Southwest’s primary function is to transport passengers safely 
and quickly from one point to another.”61  Sexual titillation was “tangential” 
to Southwest’s business and could not justify sex-based hiring.62  
As Southwest indicates, courts do not permit employers to sell sexual 
titillation along with other goods and services.  In rejecting plus-sex 
 57. See id. at 294.  As the court noted, Southwest adopted a specific female 
personality as its corporate image: 
This lady is young and vital . . . she is charming and goes through life with 
great flair and exuberance . . . you notice first her exciting smile, friendly air, 
her wit . . . yet she is quite efficient and approaches all her tasks with care and 
attention . . . . 
Id. (quoting materials Southwest’s advertising agency provided to the airline).  The court 
also noted that “[u]nabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of Southwest’s 
public image.  Its T.V. commercials feature attractive attendants in fitted outfits, catering 
to male passengers while an alluring feminine voice promises in-flight love.”  Id. at 294 
n.4. 
 58. Id. at 294-95. 
 59. Id. at 293. 
 60. Id. at 295 n.6, 304. 
 61. Id. at 302. 
 62. Id.  The court explained: 
While possession of female allure and sex appeal have been made qualifications for 
Southwest’s contact personnel by virtue of the “love” campaign, the functions 
served by employee sexuality in Southwest’s operations are not dominant ones.  
According to Southwest, female sex appeal serves two purposes: (1) attracting and 
entertaining male passengers and (2) fulfilling customer expectations for 
female service engendered by Southwest’s advertising which features female 
personnel.  As in Diaz, these non-mechanical, sex-linked job functions are only 
“tangential” to the essence of the occupations and business involved.  Southwest 
is not a business where vicarious sex entertainment is the primary service 
provided.  Accordingly, the ability of the airline to perform its primary business 
function, the transportation of passengers, would not be jeopardized by hiring 
males. 
Id. 




BFOQ defenses, courts force these businesses either to become traditional 
nonsex businesses and abandon their sexual titillation mission or, 
alternatively, to adopt a more pure sex focus. 
It is difficult, however, to argue that courts’ prohibition on sex 
discrimination by plus-sex businesses is required by some formal 
conception of sex-blind equality.  In a meaningful sense, plus-sex employers 
are treating female and male applicants equally, subjecting both to the 
same set of hiring requirements.  It is simply the case that, depending 
upon whom the employer is trying to sexually arouse, individuals of one 
sex or the other are likely to be deemed unqualified. 
Consider a restaurant owner who defines food server positions as 
requiring that individuals serve food while acting as sexually arousing 
gaze objects for heterosexual men.  If the employer’s job definition is 
accepted, then male applicants are not being denied equal treatment 
when they are refused food server jobs.  They are being refused jobs because 
they are simply not as well qualified as women given the employer’s 
stated job requirements. 
At the very least, hiring of this sort seems to fall squarely within Title 
VII’s BFOQ exception.  Sex-based hiring in such cases is necessary to 
the “normal operation of the business” as well as to its “essence” as 
conceived by both employers and customers.  To force an employer 
trying to sell heterosexual male titillation through sexy female food 
servers to also hire male food servers is to fundamentally change the 
nature of its business.  Not surprisingly then, in deciding such cases, 
courts do not just require employers to compare women and men on the 
same job-related metric as defined by employers.  Instead they redefine 
the metric employers may use to be one on which women and men will 
have similar chances of success.  Courts must, in short, first redefine the 
nature of the business at issue in order to then find that sex-based hiring 
is actionable discrimination.63  Something other than a formal principle 
of sex-blind equality is driving the initial redefinition.  This something 
else, I contend, is perfectionism. 
Courts’ prohibition on discrimination in these plus-sex cases is also 
difficult to explain by relying on a standard antisubordination principle.  
Given the far greater demand for the commodification of female 
 63. Richard Epstein strongly criticizes just this kind of redefinition.  According to 
Epstein, “the dangers of government tyranny are systematically underestimated when 
[Title VII] tells a firm that it cannot provide its customers with the service they want and 
instead tells the customers to like the services that are provided.”  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 305 
(1992). 
YURACKO_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC_POST AUTHOR EDIT 2/26/2007  11:43:27 AM 
[VOL. 43:  857, 2006]  Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 875 
 
sexuality than male sexuality,64 allowing employers to define businesses 
as including explicit sexual titillation elements would in all likelihood 
lead to a wide range of jobs from which men but not women are 
excluded.  In other words, from a purely numerical perspective, the 
sexualization of mainstream jobs is likely to help, rather than hurt, 
women’s job prospects. 
There is, however, a more subtle slippery slope antisubordination 
argument that helps to explain and justify courts’ treatment of plus-sex 
businesses.  This slippery slope argument focuses on the parade of 
horribles that would occur if employers could include sexual titillation as 
a job requirement for mainstream jobs.  Once employers are permitted to 
make hiring decisions based on their desire to sell female sexual gaze 
objects along with other goods and services, it becomes difficult to see 
why employers should not also be permitted to make hiring decisions 
based on their desire to sell not only a gendered type of sexuality, but 
also a gendered type of allure or aura, or even a particular kind of 
business ambience inextricably linked with workers of one sex or the 
other.  I refer to such hiring requirements as “sex-specific soft 
qualifications.”65  The concern is not only that jobs will be explicitly 
gendered, but that the jobs linked directly or indirectly to maleness, for 
which an employer will hire only men, will be of higher status and 
higher pay than the jobs linked directly or indirectly to femaleness, for 
which an employer will hire only women.66
 64. There is little statistical data available regarding the numbers of women and 
men in the sex industry.  However, the different circulations of Playboy and Playgirl 
magazines are suggestive of the greater social demand for commodified female sexuality 
than for commodified male sexuality.  Accounting for both newsstand and subscription 
sales, Playboy’s monthly circulation in 2001 was more than five times greater than 
Playgirl’s—3,150,000 and 575,000, respectively.  3 ULRICH’S PERIODICALS DIRECTORY 
2002, at 5716, 8105 (40th ed. 2001).  The relative pay scales of female and male 
centerfolds also reflects this greater social demand for commodified female sexuality.  
Playboy playmates are paid $25,000 for the monthly centerfold.  Playboy Playmate 
Frequently Asked Questions, Playboy Magazine, http://www.playboy.com/playmates/ 
faq/tradition.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).  In comparison, male models posing for 
the centerfold of Playgirl are paid between $1000 and $10,000, depending on whether 
the model is a celebrity and whether the model arranges independent publicity for the 
magazine.  Playgirl has never paid more than $10,000 to obtain a centerfold model.  
Interview by Lia Monahon with Michelle Zipp, Editor-in-Chief, Playgirl Magazine 
(Nov. 25, 2002). 
 65. For a fuller discussion of the distinction between technical and soft job 
qualifications see Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies, supra note 53, at 184-88. 
 66. For example, many of the jobs traditionally thought of as male—such as 
doctor, lawyer, and airline pilot—are relatively high in pay and prestige.  According to 




Consider, for example, the argument made by Joe’s Stone Crab in 
response to allegations that it discriminated against women in hiring 
food servers.  Joe’s Stone Crab is a Miami Beach landmark restaurant in 
service since 1913.67  In 1991, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) filed a charge against Joe’s alleging that it 
discriminated against women in hiring food servers.  From 1950 on, the 
serving staff at Joe’s was almost exclusively male.68  Indeed, from 1986 
through 1990, Joe’s 108 food servers were all male.69  In response to the 
EEOC’s disparate treatment claim, Joe’s argued that it did not intentionally 
discriminate against women in hiring, but instead hired so as to create a 
particular kind of Old World ambience associated with the highest 
quality restaurants in Europe.70  This ambience, Joe’s managers and experts 
made clear, was inextricably linked with male-only food servers.71
After a bench trial, the district court found that Joe’s “sought to 
emulate Old World traditions by creating an ambience in which tuxedo-
clad men served its distinctive menu.”72  Despite this factual finding, the 
district court concluded that Joe’s had not engaged in intentional 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2001 average salaries for doctors (family and general 
practitioners), lawyers, and pilots were $110,020, $91,920, and $99,400, respectively.  
See United States Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001 National Occupational 
Employment and Wage Estimates, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2001/oes_nat.htm (follow links 
to appropriate occupational field) (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).  Many jobs traditionally 
thought of as female—such as nurses, secretaries, and kindergarten teachers—are 
relatively lower in pay and prestige.  That same year, nurses, secretaries, and kindergarten 
teachers earned an average of $48,240, $25,710, and $41,100, respectively.  Id.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, then, in the almost forty years since the passage of Title VII, women 
have made great strides in entering at least some of these male fields.  Women make up 
27.9% of doctors and 29.6% of lawyers, but only 3.7% of airline pilots.  See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2001, at 380-82 (121st 
ed.).  In contrast, men have not rushed to become nurses, secretaries, or kindergarten 
teachers.  These jobs remain overwhelmingly female, with women making up 92.8% of 
registered nurses, 98.9% of secretaries, and 98.5% of kindergarten teachers.  Id. 
 67. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 727, 730 (S.D. Fla. 1997), 
vacated by 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
 68. Id. at 731.
 69. Id. at 733.  In the years after the EEOC filed its charge against Joe’s, the 
restaurant added eighty-eight food servers, nineteen of whom were women.  Id. 
 70. Id. at 732-33. 
 71. Id. at 731-32.  In fact, Joe’s former owner and manager, Grace Weiss, 
attributed the company’s male-only hiring practices to “the ambience of the restaurant” 
and other factors.  Id. at 732 (emphasis omitted).  Joe’s expert in restaurant management, 
Karen McNeil, helped elaborate precisely what kind of atmosphere Joe’s was trying to 
create and why the appropriate atmosphere was necessarily exclusively male: 
It has been an attitude and standard, it comes from Europe.  In all of Europe 
you will find in all of the grade three restaurants in Europe, there is an 
impression that service at that high level is the environment of men, and that it 
ought to be that way. 
Id. 
 72. Id. at 733. 
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discrimination against women.73  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
necessarily accepted that a job candidate’s ability to contribute to the 
particular ambience that Joe’s sought to create was a legitimate qualification 
upon which Joe’s could base hiring decisions. 
The court of appeals, however, did not agree.74  According to the Eleventh 
Circuit, Joe’s practice of hiring food servers based, in part, on the sex-
specific soft qualification of their ability to contribute to the restaurant’s 
Old World ambience was an illegitimate form of intentional sex 
discrimination.75
The slippery slope argument contends that if mainstream employers 
are permitted to make sexuality a job requirement, it will be impossible 
to keep mainstream employers, like Joe’s, from making other sex-specific 
soft qualifications job requirements.  Again, the danger is not only that 
women will be disproportionately excluded from jobs, but that they will 
be excluded from jobs that are the most desirable.   
In actual fact, however, the slope may not be so slippery.  Simply 
recognizing sexiness as a job requirement in plus-sex businesses does 
not necessarily mean that courts will be unable to prevent employers 
from requiring a wide range of other sex-specific soft qualifications.  
Courts could easily, and reasonably, hold that sex-based hiring by 
businesses trying to sell a particular type of sexual arousal is necessary 
and bona fide, while sex-based hiring in order to provide a more diffuse 
and socially constructed kind of gendered atmosphere is not. 
Courts could, for example, distinguish between a restaurant’s desire to 
sell sexual titillation along with food and an investment bank’s desire to 
sell male machismo along with investment advice, permitting sex-based 
hiring in the former but not the latter.  This distinction may be justified 
either on the ground that the former is more biologically linked than the 
latter, and hence raises a stronger demand for sex-based hiring, or on the 
ground that while both “goods” require sex-based hiring, only the former 
is valuable and significant enough to customers and employers to justify 
sex-based hiring. 
 73. Id. at 741. 
 74. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 75. The court of appeals explained: “[T]he record extant and some of the district 
court’s findings of fact can be read to support the alternate conclusion that Joe’s 
management intentionally excluded women from food serving positions in order to 
provide its customers with an ‘Old World,’ fine-dining ambience.”  Id. at 1281 
(emphasis omitted). 




It is difficult, then, to understand courts’ prohibition on sexual titillation 
in mainstream jobs without resort to underlying perfectionist ideals.  
Courts’ wholesale redefinition of these businesses—stripping them of 
their explicit sexualization element—is simply neither demanded nor 
explained by Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandates. 
Such redefinition reveals instead both a sense of the importance of 
promoting individuals’ intellectual and cognitive development and a 
sense of the danger that explicit sexualization poses to such development.  
Consider, for example, courts’ rulings in sexual harassment cases 
prompted by employer attempts to explicitly sexualize workers.  In EEOC 
v. Sage Realty Corp., the plaintiff, Margaret Hasselman, worked as a 
lobby attendant in an office building in New York City.76  Her employer 
referred to her position as that of “lobby hostess”77 and employed only 
women in the position.78
As part of her job, Hasselman wore a theme-based uniform that 
changed approximately every six months.79  In the spring of 1976, Sage 
required Hasselman to wear a bicentennial uniform, which was a red, 
white, and blue poncho-like outfit.  Although the uniform was largely 
open on the sides, Hasselman was not permitted to wear a shirt under the 
uniform and could only wear blue dance pants on her legs.80  The 
uniform revealed Hasselman’s thighs, portions of her buttocks, and both 
sides of her body.81
Hasselman sued Sage arguing that the costume inappropriately turned 
her into a sex object82 and made her the target of sexual propositions, 
lewd comments, and obscene gestures.83  The district court ruled that the 
uniform requirement constituted illegal sex discrimination because the 
bicentennial uniform caused Hasselman to be sexually harassed.84  The 
 76. 507 F. Supp. 599, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 77. Id. at n.3. 
 78. Id. at 609 n.15 (“Defendants adopted an all-female ‘lobby hostess’ practice in 
the fall of 1975.”). 
 79. Id. at 603-04. 
 80. Id. at 604. 
 81. Id. at 605 & n.11. 
 82. Id. at 606 & n.12.  Hasselman complained about her sexualization in a letter to 
Sage’s president.  Hasselman wrote: 
[T]he uniform is apparently designed in such a way that it is sexually 
revealing. . . .  I always see my post in the lobby as one which is charged with 
definite duties and responsibilities.  None of these duties and responsibilities . . . 
requires me to be a sex symbol in skimpy costume. . . .  To put it simply, the 
uniform that I am required to wear is degradative [sic] to my character and 
offensive to me as a woman. 
Id. at 606 n.12 (second alteration in original). 
 83. Id. at 605-06. 
 84. Id. at 609-10 (“In requiring Hasselman to wear the revealing Bicentennial 
uniform in the lobby of 711 Third Avenue, defendants made her acquiescence in sexual 
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court did more, however, than order the employer to stop the harassment.85  
It also ruled that Sage could not require Hasselman to wear a sexually 
revealing uniform.86  The court simply would not permit Sage to explicitly 
sexualize Hasselman’s lobby attendant position. 
Similarly, in Priest v. Rotary, a hotel lounge hired the plaintiff to work 
as a cocktail waitress.87  When the plaintiff refused to wear clothing that 
was sufficiently sexually revealing, she was reassigned to the hotel 
coffee shop where waitresses received significantly lower tips.  While 
working at the coffee shop, the plaintiff was subjected to repeated sexual 
touching by the supervisor who had hired her.  Again, the court held not 
only that the supervisor had engaged in illegal sexual harassment, but 
also that the supervisor had acted illegally by requiring the plaintiff to 
wear sexually revealing clothes and sell sexual titillation along with 
drinks as part of the job of cocktail waitress.88
harassment by the public, and perhaps by building tenants, a prerequisite of her 
employment as a lobby attendant.”). 
 85. Even the court’s very conclusion that the conduct at issue in this case 
constituted harassment seemed to depend on its implicit conclusion that this was not a 
business in which the sale of sex was permissible or appropriate.  To the extent that the 
employer in Sage Realty was attempting to define the job of lobby hostess as involving 
the explicit sale of sexual titillation along with various lobby services, it is not clear that 
the sexual comments and gestures the plaintiff received would actually constitute sexual 
harassment.  Several commentators have argued, for example, that what constitutes sexual 
harassment must be context specific, for example, conduct that might be considered legal 
harassment when directed at a librarian might not so qualify when directed at a stripper.  
See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by 
Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447 
(1994); Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to 
Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 
1146-47 (1995). 
 86. According to the court, Sage was not justified in putting Hasselman in a 
sexually revealing uniform because sexual titillation was not a BFOQ of the position.  
The court explained: 
While it may well be a [BFOQ] for Sage to require female lobby attendants in 
its buildings to wear certain uniforms designed to present a unique image, in 
accordance with its philosophy of urban design, it is beyond dispute that the 
wearing of sexually revealing garments does not constitute a [BFOQ]. 
Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. at 611. 
 87. 634 F. Supp. 571, 574 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
 88. Id. at 574-76, 581.  The court explained: 
Title VII is . . . violated when an employer requires a female employee to wear 
sexually suggestive attire as a condition of employment.  Plaintiff Priest 
established a prima facie violation of Title VII by demonstrating that defendant 
Rotary removed her from her full-time, permanent employment as a cocktail 
lounge waitress because she refused to wear such sexually suggestive dress.  




These sexual harassment decisions, like the BFOQ decisions, reflect a 
judicial concern not only with ensuring women access to jobs, but with 
ensuring women access to particular kinds of jobs—those that will foster 
a valuable kind of human development.  This valuable self-development 
emphasizes rational and intellectual, rather than sexual, capabilities.  
Moreover, the decisions reflect a skepticism about the possibility, perhaps 
for women in particular, of developing these valued capacities in 
contexts that have explicit sexual and nonsexual components.  In other 
words, courts’ neat division of the work world into sex and nonsex jobs 
and their unwillingness to allow employers to sexualize mainstream jobs 
seems driven, at least in part, by an implicit perfectionism that seeks to 
promote and protect women’s ability to develop as intellectual and 
rational actors by carving out a work space where they cannot be 
formally and explicitly sexualized.  
In sum, courts’ decisions in these sexuality-related discrimination 
cases reveal a fairly consistent and uniform set of perfectionist ideals.  
Courts routinely prohibit explicit sexual titillation demands within 
mainstream businesses in order to preserve a desexualized zone of the 
work world in which women and men will be explicitly and exclusively 
valued for their intellectual and cognitive achievements.  Courts routinely 
permit sex discrimination on behalf of customer privacy preferences in 
order to protect individuals’ ability to shield their bodies and sexuality 
from forced market exposure.  Intellectual development and noncommodified 
forms of sexual autonomy and expression are distinctly valued while 
commodified sexuality is deemed less valuable and even, in some 
contexts, potentially harmful.   
Empirical research provides some support for courts’ underlying 
disaggregation hypothesis.  Studies suggest that the sexualization or 
hyper-feminization of women in the workplace alters the way they are 
treated by others, so that their intellectual and professional attributes are 
less likely to be recognized and encouraged.  Psychologists Brad Bushman 
and Angelica Bonnaci conducted a study in which subjects watched 
sexually explicit and neutral television programs.  They found that after 
viewing sexual images, people of both sexes had impaired memory for 
the substance of whatever had come next.89  These television findings may 
also hold with respect to interpersonal contact. 
Defendant Rotary failed to articulate any legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for the imposition of the dress requirement on Ms. Priest. 
Id. at 581 (citations omitted). 
 89. See Brad J. Bushman & Angelica M. Bonacci, Violence and Sex Impair 
Memory for Television Ads, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 557 (2002).  Bushman and Bonacci 
studied the effects that watching violent, sexually explicit, or neutral television shows 
had on individuals’ ability to recall the substance of commercials embedded within the 
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It may be that the more explicitly sexualized women are, the more 
distracted men are, and the less men listen to the substance of what 
women say.  Other studies show that the feminization of women in the 
work world, even without their explicit sexualization, leads to perceptions 
of their diminished professional competency.  Sandra Forsythe and her 
colleagues found that simply dressing female managerial job candidates 
in feminine clothing caused them to be perceived as less competent for 
managerial positions.90  One can reasonably assume that such perceptions of 
diminished capability affect the way others treat and interact with these 
feminized women. 
Research suggests that sexualizing women at work may also undermine 
women’s intellectual development by diverting their own energies and 
attention from intellectual pursuits to their physical and sexual appearance.  
Consider a 1998 study by Barbara Fredrickson and her colleagues seeking 
to test the impact of women’s self-objectification on their ability to 
perform intellectually demanding tasks.91  The researchers had male and 
female students take a challenging math test while trying on either a 
swimsuit or a sweater.  The swimsuit was meant to trigger, at least for 
women, the same body consciousness caused by their social sexual 
objectification. 
shows.  Bushman and Bonacci found that memory recall was impaired for individuals 
watching either violent or sexually explicit shows and suggested that the impairment 
might be due to individuals focusing more of their attention on violent and sexually 
explicit shows than on neutral shows, and this increased attention decreases the attention 
they can direct to any other competing message.  Id. at 561. 
 90. See Sandra Monk Forsythe et al., Dress as an Influence on the Perceptions of 
Management Characteristics in Women, 13 HOME ECON. RES. J. 112 (1984); Sandra 
Forsythe et al., Influence of Applicant’s Dress on Interviewer’s Selection Decisions, 70 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374 (1985).  Forsythe and her colleagues had seventy-seven personnel 
administrators, 80% of whom were male, evaluate videotapes of four applicants for a 
managerial position.  The applicants were dressed in outfits that differed in their degree 
of masculinity and femininity.  Participants rated video applicants as being least forceful, 
self-reliant, dynamic, aggressive, and decisive when they wore the most distinctly 
feminine dress.  Interestingly, though, participants viewed the female candidates as most 
strongly possessing these traits not when they wore the most masculine outfit but when 
they wore the second most masculine outfit.  The researchers hypothesized that this 
occurred because the participants viewed the most masculine outfit as being inappropriate for 
women, and it therefore resulted in lower managerial competency ratings.  See Forsythe, 
Dress as an Influence on the Perceptions of Management Characteristics in Women, 
supra at 118-19; Forsythe, Influence of Applicant’s Dress on Interviewer’s Selection 
Decisions, supra at 375-78. 
 91. Barbara Fredrickson et al., That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex Differences in 
Self-Objectification, Restrained Eating, and Math Performance, 75 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 269 (1998). 




The study involved eighty-two undergraduate students at the University 
of Michigan, forty-two women and forty men.92  Researchers told participants 
that they were taking part in a study concerning “emotions and consumer 
behavior.”93  After first bolstering the cover story by asking participants 
to evaluate a fragrance, researchers left participants alone in a room and 
told them, over headphones, to try on either a swimsuit or a sweater.  They 
randomly assigned female participants to try on either a one-piece swimsuit 
or a V-neck sweater.  They randomly assigned male participants to try on 
either swim trunks or a crew-neck sweater.94  While wearing either the 
swimsuit or the sweater, participants completed questionnaires asking 
how they felt about themselves—both generally and at that moment.  
Researchers then asked the participants, again via headphones, to 
complete a math test, which they claimed was unrelated to the study. 
Fredrickson and her colleagues found that individuals in the swimsuit 
were more focused on their bodies and described themselves more in 
terms of their bodies than individuals wearing the sweaters.95  According 
to the researchers, wearing the swimsuit caused an increase in self-
objectification—an increase in the feeling that “I am my body”—for 
both women and men as compared to those wearing the sweater.96 This 
self-objectification differed, however, in both its nature and effect for the 
female and male students. 
Wearing the swimsuit prompted women to feel an increase in shame 
about their bodies but did not raise such feelings in men.97  More 
importantly, wearing a swimsuit actually impaired women’s, but not 
men’s, intellectual performance.  Controlling for students’ past performance 
on standardized math tests, the researchers found that women wearing 
the swimsuits performed significantly worse on the math test than did 
women wearing the sweaters.  Men’s performance on the math test was 
not affected by what they were wearing.98  The researchers concluded, 
somewhat cautiously, that women’s self-objectification “does indeed 
draw on women’s attentional resources and disrupt[s] their mental 
performance.”99
 92. Id. at 276-77. 
 93. Id. at 277. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  The researchers describe self-objectification as a preoccupation with 
physical appearance.  Id. at 270-71. 
 97. Id. at 277-78.  Body shame was measured based on participants’ degree of 
endorsement of statements such as “I wish I were invisible,” “I feel like covering my 
body,” and “I wish I could disappear,” and on participants’ ratings of how much they 
would like to change specific attributes of their bodies.  Id. at 273, 276-77. 
 98. Id. at 279. 
 99. Id. at 280. 
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Subsequent research suggests that the negative effects of self-
objectification may not in fact be sex-specific.  Michelle Hebl and her 
colleagues hypothesized that the Fredrickson study found a sex-based 
performance impact because the study did not induce a parallel state of 
self-objectification for men and women.  Hebl and her colleagues 
replicated the Fredrickson study, but instead of asking male participants 
to wear either a sweater or swim trunks, as Fredrickson had, they asked 
male participants to wear either a sweater or a Speedo bathing suit. 
The researchers believed that asking male participants to try on 
Speedos placed men in comparably objectifying conditions to those 
experienced by their female counterparts.100  The researchers found that 
men in the Speedo, just like women in the swimsuit, did indeed perform 
more poorly on the math test than their sweater-clad counterparts.101  
Together, these studies suggest that courts may indeed be right in 
viewing the explicit sexualization of the workplace as potentially 
dangerous to other more valuable forms of individual development. 
IV.  GENDER NONCONFORMITY AT WORK 
In this section, I examine an area of case law in which courts’ 
antidiscrimination decisions also reveal underlying perfectionist value 
judgments but where these judgments are fractured and inconsistent—
namely, cases addressing the antidiscrimination demands of gender 
nonconforming women and men.  The cases reveal, through their 
inconsistency and incoherence, courts’ own disagreement about the value 
of different conceptions and expressions of gender and personal identity. 
Courts’ treatment of discrimination against gender nonconforming 
women and men is unstable and muddled.  With some exceptions discussed 
in more detail shortly, courts treat discrimination against butch women 
and effeminate men as actionable sex discrimination102 but allow 
 100. Michelle R. Hebl et al., The Swimsuit Becomes Us All: Ethnicity, Gender, and 
Vulnerability to Self-Objectification, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1322, 
1324 (2004). 
 101. Id. at 1329 (“[A]ll participants tended to perform worse when they were in a 
self-objectifying situation than when they were in the control condition.”).  The 
researchers also found a general increase in body shame among women and men in the 
swimsuit as opposed to the sweater.  Id. at 1327. 
 102. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that 
discrimination against a woman for failing to behave in a feminine enough manner 
constituted discrimination because of sex), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-1966, 105 Stat. 1071 (setting new standards for the affirmative 




discrimination against those who violate sex-specific grooming codes or 
engage in cross-dressing.103  Employers must bear the costs of including 
defense in “mixed motive” cases but not affecting the holding regarding what constitutes 
sex-based discrimination, as cited in many of the cases listed here), as recognized in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994); Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant 
Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that “[a]t its essence, the 
systematic abuse directed at [plaintiff] reflected a belief that [plaintiff] did not act as a 
man should act” and concluding that discrimination of this sort constituted actionable 
harassment “because of sex”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 
262-63 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “a plaintiff may be able to prove that same-sex 
harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the harasser’s 
conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of 
his or her gender.”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that 
“[t]he Court in Price Waterhouse implied that a suit alleging harassment or disparate 
treatment based upon nonconformity with sexual stereotypes is cognizable under Title 
VII as discrimination because of sex”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 
F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “just as a woman can ground an action 
on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not meet stereotyped 
expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on evidence that other men 
discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped expectations of 
masculinity”) (citation omitted); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 
581 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his 
physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his 
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear 
and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex”), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) 
(remanding for further consideration in light of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 
523 U.S. 75 (1998)); Martin v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 224 F. Supp. 2d 
434, 446-47 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing sex stereotyping as a form of sex 
discrimination but finding that the plaintiff did not present any evidence showing that he 
was, or was perceived by his coworkers to be, effeminate); Heller v. Columbia 
Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217-18, 1222-25 (D. Or. 2002) 
(denying defendant’s summary judgment motion and holding that discrimination because 
of female plaintiff’s masculine traits and appearance constituted valid Title VII sexual 
harassment claim); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that 
the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of sex discrimination to survive summary 
judgment by showing that his coworkers “punished him because they perceived him to 
be impermissibly feminine for a man”); Ianetta v. Putnam Invs., Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 
131, 134 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action under 
Title VII where he alleged that he was discriminated against because he did not conform 
to the male gender stereotype), dismissed, 183 F. Supp. 2d. 415 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(granting post discovery summary judgment after finding insufficient evidence of sex 
discrimination).   
 103. See, e.g., Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908-09 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that it did not violate Title VII for an employer to require male 
employees to have short hair while imposing no similar restriction on female 
employees); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 
1975) (holding that company policy prohibiting long hair for male employees but not for 
female employees did not violate Title VII); Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. CIV.A. 
00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002) (granting defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on grounds that the male employee who was terminated 
for dressing and acting like a woman during off-work hours was not discriminated 
against because of sex); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284, 285-87 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual who claimed she 
was discriminated against by, among other things, being forced to dress as a man, could 
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the first group of gender nonconformists in the workplace while the 
latter group must bear the costs of changing themselves if they want 
inclusion.  Certainly some of courts’ antidiscrimination mandates may be 
justified by antisubordination concerns and still others may be justified 
by a particularly “thick” conception of sex-blind equality.  Neither traditional 
doctrine explains, however, why courts limit antidiscrimination protection 
in the ways they do.  Ultimately, courts’ distinction between protected 
and unprotected forms of gender bending reflects changing and unsettled 
judicial judgments about the relative worth of different forms of gender 
identity expression. 
The Supreme Court laid the groundwork for antidiscrimination 
protection of gender nonconformists in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.104  
Ann Hopkins had worked in the Washington, D.C., office of Price 
Waterhouse for five years when the partners in that office proposed her 
for partnership in 1982.105  Hopkins was the only woman among eighty-
eight employees proposed for partnership that year.106  The district court 
judge who initially heard Hopkins’s sex discrimination case found that 
“[n]one of the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year 
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major 
contracts for the partnership.”107  Nonetheless, Hopkins was passed over 
for partnership and held for reconsideration the following year.108
The man assigned by Price Waterhouse to tell Hopkins why they held 
over her candidacy provided her with several suggestions for improving 
not state a claim for sex discrimination); Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 
602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that it did not constitute sex discrimination under 
Oregon law for an employer to fire a man for wearing an earring when female employees 
were permitted to do the same thing).  But see Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 
729, 738 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding sex discrimination stemming from male employee’s 
adverse treatment resulting from his feminine mannerisms and appearance); Smith v. 
City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff penalized 
for feminine appearance could state a claim for sex discrimination).  See generally infra 
note 136 and accompanying text (discussing these opinions further).  
 104. 490 U.S. 228. 
 105. Id. at 233. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 234 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 
(D.D.C. 1985), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d, Price 
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228). 
 108. Id. at 233.  Of the eighty-eight people proposed for partnership that year, forty-
seven were admitted to the partnership, twenty-one were rejected, and twenty were held 
for reconsideration the following year.  Id. 




her chances the following year.109  He told her she should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”110
The Supreme Court, ruling in favor of Hopkins, held that it was an 
impermissible form of sex discrimination for an employer to penalize a 
woman for acting in the aggressive and competitive ways deemed 
acceptable and even desirable in men.  The Court held that “an employer 
who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or 
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”111  Sex stereotyping 
of this sort, the Court held, was actionable sex discrimination and was 
clearly present in this case.  According to the Court: 
It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an 
aggressive female employee as requiring “a course at charm school.”  Nor . . . 
does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed 
“interpersonal skills” can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of 
lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has 
drawn the criticism.112
Price Waterhouse was ultimately ordered to admit Hopkins to the 
partnership.113
The Supreme Court justified its antidiscrimination requirement on 
antisubordination grounds.  Women would be put in an impermissible 
“catch 22,” the Court said, if they could be penalized for being aggressive 
and competitive when prestigious jobs often required these very 
characteristics.114  Women would be denied high powered jobs if they 
 109. Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117). 
 110. Id.  As part of the partnership consideration process, several partners at Price 
Waterhouse submitted comments regarding Hopkins’s candidacy.  Several of these also 
touched on Hopkins’s apparent gender inappropriateness: 
One partner described her as “macho”; another suggested that she 
“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third advised her to take “a course at 
charm school.”  Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, 
one partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only 
“because it’s a lady using foul language.”  Another supporter explained that 
Hopkins “ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed 
[manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
[partner] candidate.” 
Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 111. Id. at 250. 
 112. Id. at 256. 
 113. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming 
the lower court’s order that Hopkins be admitted to the partnership); see also ANN 
BRANIGAR HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY (1996) (describing 
the circumstances preceding and following Hopkins’ sex discrimination case against 
Price Waterhouse). 
 114. According to the Court, “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in 
women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and 
YURACKO_POST AUTHOR EDIT.DOC_POST AUTHOR EDIT 2/26/2007  11:43:27 AM 
[VOL. 43:  857, 2006]  Sameness, Subordination, and Perfectionism 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 887 
 
were not aggressive and competitive—because they would then not be 
able to successfully do the job—and denied such jobs if they were 
aggressive and competitive—because such traits were found unpleasant 
in women.  Such a double bind, the Court held, was impermissible, as it 
would deny women access to a wide range of jobs, particularly those 
with power and prestige.115  “Title VII lifts women out of this bind” by 
demanding a disconnect between the social perception of aggressiveness 
in women with bitchiness.116
Several scholars have argued that Price Waterhouse’s antisubordination 
principle demands similar antidiscrimination protection for both effeminate 
men and cross-dressers.  Such antisubordination arguments necessarily 
focus on the importance for women of preventing certain kinds of 
discrimination against men.  Scholars have argued, for example, that 
discrimination against effeminate men is a means of policing gender 
roles in the workplace and reaffirming gender scripts that discourage 
men from engaging in nurturing and caregiving activities.  Such 
discrimination, the argument goes, pushes men to act in hyper-masculine 
and traditionally “macho” ways.  While such role policing confines men, 
it also undermines women’s ability to compete successfully in the 
workplace.117  Allowing employers to discriminate against effeminate 
men reinforces gender norms that define male workers in large part by 
impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they 
do not.”  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id.  The holding in Price Waterhouse is also consistent with an underlying 
perfectionism emphasizing the importance of an aggressive and assertive model of self-
determination.  Indeed, the Court’s choice to require employers to accept butch women, 
rather than to reformulate jobs to accommodate the demure and feminine, may indicate 
just such perfectionist principles.  Perfectionism is not necessary, however, to make 
sense of the Court’s holding.  As suggested here, one can explain Price Waterhouse by 
antisubordination concerns alone.  The Court’s choice between reshaping preferences 
toward butch women and reshaping jobs to no longer require butchness is also consistent 
with a sense that it is simply more efficient to disturb the connection for women between 
butchness and bitchiness than to restructure high profile jobs so that the demure and 
feminine can do them as effectively. 
 117. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, analyzes both the cause and desired effect 
of the harassment of a gender-deviant man by his male coworkers as follows: “Goluszek 
was punished, ostracized, insulted, and forced to consume pornography to make him 
conform to [his male coworkers’] stereotype of how a man should be a man by 
subordinating women sexually.”  Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual 
Victimization, Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 10-11, Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 471814 
(discussing Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill. 1988)). 




their superiority over their female coworkers, thereby making women’s 
effective participation in the workplace more difficult.118
Mary Anne Case has been the most articulate proponent of a similar 
antisubordination argument in favor of protecting male cross-dressers.  
“[U]nfortunately,” Case contends, “the world will not be safe for women 
in frilly pink dresses—they will not, for example, generally be as 
respected as either men or women in gray flannel suits—unless and until 
it is made safe for men in dresses as well.”119  As with the argument for 
protecting effeminate men, an antisubordination argument for protecting 
cross-dressing men focuses on the need for such protection in order to 
facilitate women’s, not men’s, integration into the work world and 
successful participation there.  Women’s full respect and integration in 
the workplace requires, according to Case, not only challenging the 
normativity of maleness in the workplace but challenging the normativity of 
male styles of dress as well.120
Although lower courts have relied on Price Waterhouse to extend 
antidiscrimination protection to some gender nonconforming men, they 
have not relied on the case’s antisubordination premise as a reason for 
doing so.  Courts routinely rely on Price Waterhouse to protect effeminate 
men, but make no mention in those cases of any antisubordination 
concerns. 
Instead, such courts have stripped the Price Waterhouse holding of its 
antisubordination foundation.  They interpret the case as prohibiting not 
only those forms of sex stereotyping that reinforce traditional forms of 
sex-based subordination, but all sex stereotyping by which women and 
men are treated differently for engaging in the same behavior.  They 
 118. For several versions of this argument, see generally Kathryn Abrams, The New 
Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169, 1205-07 (1998) 
(describing how sexual harassment creates male control in the workplace and perpetuates 
masculine norms); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 691, 760 (1997) (remarking that sexual harassment is a problem for both 
men and women as it is a “mechanism by which an orthodoxy regarding masculinity and 
femininity is enforced, policed, and perpetuated in the workplace”); Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1776 (1998) (“Just as 
dominant male workers may harass women who threaten their idealized image of 
masculinity on the job, they may also harass such nonconforming men.”). 
 119. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1995). 
 120. I have, elsewhere, challenged Case’s antisubordination claims.  It seems to me 
unlikely that having men in dresses in the workplace would challenge norms about 
women in dresses, or women more generally in the workplace.  Instead, my suspicion is 
that men in dresses would only emphasize the non-normativity of feminine dress that is 
usually, although not exclusively, associated with women, leading career-minded 
women, and men, to avoid such clothing choices.  See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait 
Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
167, 228-29 (2004). 
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interpret the case, in other words, as requiring a kind of formal status-
blind trait equality whereby men must be permitted to do whatever 
women can do and vice versa.121
This reformulation of Price Waterhouse is perplexing for two reasons.  
It is difficult to understand as a conceptual matter, and it is difficult to 
reconcile with courts’ actual decisionmaking. 
As a conceptual matter, it is not clear that in the sex context defining 
nondiscrimination as status-blind trait equality makes theoretical or 
practical sense.  Nondiscrimination as status blindness requires that 
women and men engaged in the same behavior be treated the same.  It is 
not clear, however, that women and men can ever engage in precisely 
the same behavior in precisely the same way. 
In a sexist society, nothing done by men and women has precisely the 
same meaning.  Traits are not understood or viewed as isolated technical 
attributes.  They are necessarily viewed in relation to all of the other 
traits an individual possesses and through a systematically gendered 
lens.  Traits such as competitiveness or active leadership, for example, 
are perceived very differently when possessed by women or men.  
Consider one study in which researchers told participants to evaluate job 
candidates for a position as a university computer lab manager.  Participants 
viewed videotapes and read “life philosophy” essays from female and 
male candidates.122  Researchers found that female candidates with essays 
that emphasized “agentic” qualities such as competitiveness were rated 
 121. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“[A] plaintiff may be able to prove that same-sex harassment was 
discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the harasser’s conduct was 
motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of his or her 
gender”); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that 
“Price Waterhouse sets a rule that bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes” 
and agreeing with Sanchez’s contention “that the holding in Price Waterhouse applies 
with equal force to a man who is discriminated against for acting too feminine”); Higgins 
v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Price 
Waterhouse to support its conclusion that men can sue for discrimination based on 
“stereotyped expectations of masculinity”); Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill. 119 F.3d 563, 
580 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins . . . 
makes clear that Title VII does not permit an employee to be treated adversely because 
his or her appearance or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles.”), 
vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (remanding for further consideration in light of Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)). 
 122. Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and 
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 749-50 (2001).  The study 
involved 172 undergraduates at Rutgers University—105 women and 67 men.  Id. at 
749. 




“less socially skilled and likeable than an identically presented man.”123  
Another study found that the same leadership activities of women and 
men resulted in very different affective responses from those dealing 
with them.124  Women engaging in group leadership activities received 
more displeased responses and fewer pleased responses from group 
members than did men engaging in the same behavior and making the 
same suggestions and arguments.125   
Price Waterhouse itself provides a good example of such gendered 
meanings.  It is simply not the case that Hopkins was fired for exhibiting 
the same behavior that her male coworkers exhibited.  Social meanings 
are real.  Aggressiveness in women is bitchy in a way that aggressiveness in 
men is not.  Competitiveness in women is threatening in a way that 
competitiveness in men is not.  Vulgarity in women is shocking and 
disturbing in a way that vulgarity in men is not.  Even if Ann Hopkins 
had engaged in the same types of conduct as her male colleagues, her 
behavior would not have been socially the same.  Moreover, even when 
technical trait symmetries are possible, in the sense that women and men 
can physically do precisely the same thing, traits will mean very 
different things when possessed by a woman or by a man.  Consider a 
man fired for wearing high-heeled shoes to work.  What it means to wear 
heels as a man is very different from what it means to wear high heels as 
a woman.  Wearing high heels as a woman fits into a particular pattern 
of aesthetic traits and attributes commonly and acceptably associated 
with women.  Wearing high heels has meaning for women—a meaning 
 123. Id. at 757. 
 124. See Doré Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and 
Female Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 48, 54-57 (1990).  The study involved 168 student participants—84 women 
and 84 men.  Id. at 49.  Participants took part in small discussion groups composed of 
one male and one female participant plus one male and one female confederate trained 
by the researchers to perform the role of group leader in a standardized manner.  Id.  The 
study used two leader scripts, A and B, in all discussions.  Id.  In half the sessions, the 
male leader used script A while the female leader used script B; in the other sessions it 
was reversed.  Id.  Coders sat in an adjacent room behind one-way mirrors and tallied 
participants’ nonverbal affect expressions.  Id. at 50.  Coders tallied nonverbal cues of 
pleasure—such as smiling or nodding in agreement—and nonverbal cues of 
displeasure—such as a furrowed brow, tightening of the mouth, or nods of disagreement.  
Id.  In addition to controlling what the female and male leaders said, the researchers 
monitored the leaders for eye contact, gaze direction, body posture, amount of body 
movement, talking time, and four attitude measures—such as “friendly” and “aggressive.”  Id. 
at 50-51.  They found that the leaders did not differ significantly in any area except 
talking time, probably because participants challenged the female leaders more often.  
Id.; see also Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-
Analysis, 111 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 16 (1992) (finding that women managers with a direct 
task-oriented leadership style are evaluated more negatively than men with similar 
management styles). 
 125. Butler & Geis, supra note 124, at 54. 
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associated with sexiness, dressiness, and physical display which stems 
from the trait’s comfortable place within gender appropriate behavior.  
What it means to wear high heels as a man is entirely different.  High-
heel wearing is not part of a set of gender appropriate behaviors for men.  
As a result, high-heel wearing for men is commonly perceived as neither 
sexy nor dressy, but simply deviant and strange.126
The lack of a real cross-sex parallel to the aggressive woman or the 
cross-dressing man raises significant problems for a status-blind 
conception of nondiscrimination.  To whom must Hopkins be compared 
in order to determine if Price Waterhouse engaged in sex discrimination—a 
swearing, aggressive man or a man engaged in socially inappropriate and 
offensive office behavior?  Similarly, to whom must the man in heels be 
compared—a woman in high heels or a woman in gender inappropriate and 
strange clothing?127
Given the social reality of gender, an antidiscrimination law requiring 
sex-blind trait equality is at best indeterminate and at worst incoherent.  
This may, however, suggest the real points of courts’ sex stereotyping 
prohibition rather than the problem with it.  
The prohibition on sex stereotyping may reflect a significantly 
“thicker” conception of sex blindness—one requiring the eradication of, 
or at least willful blindness toward, gender norms.  The underlying idea 
may be that nondiscrimination requires rigid neutrality toward women 
and men engaged in technically similar behavior, not because the 
 126. In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., for example, the district court saw a man 
dressing as a woman as not only dissimilar from a woman dressing as a woman, but as 
disordered.  Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. CIV. A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at 
*5 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002).  According to the court: 
[T]his is not a situation where the plaintiff failed to conform to a gender 
stereotype.  Plaintiff was not discharged because he did not act sufficiently 
masculine or because he exhibited traits normally valued in a female employee, 
but disparaged in a male employee. . . .  The plaintiff was terminated because he is 
a man with a sexual or gender identity disorder who, in order to publicly 
disguise himself as a woman, wears women’s clothing, shoes, underwear, 
breast prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish, pretends to be a woman, and 
publicly identifies himself as a woman named “Donna.” 
Id. 
 127. To point out that women and men can never possess precisely the same traits 
in precisely the same way is not to argue that employers are therefore justified in treating 
women and men differently.  Recognizing the gendered meanings of traits is important, 
though, because it highlights that, to the extent that women and men should be treated 
the same, it is not because they are in fact precisely the same but in spite of the fact that 
they are not. 




behavior really looks the same, but because the reason it looks different 
is illegitimate.  Employers must be blind not only to sex as an 
independent characteristic when making employment decisions, they 
must also be blind to all the ways in which gender norms affect the 
social meanings attached to various behaviors and characteristics.  This 
thick conception of sex blindness provides an analytical basis for, if not 
justification of, courts’ anti-sex-stereotyping rhetoric.128
This thick conception of antidiscrimination as sex blindness does not, 
however, explain courts’ actual decisions.  If one were to accept the 
notion that women and men performing similar acts must be treated the 
same regardless of gender norms, it makes no sense to distinguish, as 
courts do, between employers’ treatment of men with effeminate 
mannerisms and their treatment of men in dresses or lipstick.  Surely if 
sex blindness means that employers must treat effeminate men the same 
as feminine women, they must also treat men in dresses and lipstick the 
same as women in dresses and lipstick.129  Courts’ anti-sex-stereotyping 
interpretation of Price Waterhouse should, in other words, lead to 
prohibitions on discrimination against cross-dressing men, against those 
 128. There is not a good antidiscrimination-based justification for throwing out all 
gender norms without regard to their import or effect.  See Yuracko, supra note 120, at 
198-204. 
 129. This is precisely the argument made by both Mary Anne Case and Richard 
Posner and is the reason that Case favors, and Posner disfavors, such an interpretation of 
Price Waterhouse.  Case contends: 
[E]ffeminate men . . . as well as . . . men who violate sex-specific grooming 
codes by wearing feminine attire to work . . . are clearly protected by both the 
plain language of Title VII and the holding in Hopkins.  If their employer 
tolerates feminine behavior or attire in women but not in them, the employer is 
subjecting them to disparate treatment in violation of Title VII. 
Case, supra note 119, at 7.  Posner, meanwhile, argues that “the case law has gone off 
tracks in the matter of ‘sex stereotyping’ . . . ” precisely because some courts are 
interpreting Title VII to lead to the conclusions for which Case argued.  Hamm v. 
Wyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (2003) (Posner, J., concurring).  
According to Posner: 
[T]here is a difference that subsequent cases [post-Hopkins] have ignored 
between, on the one hand, using evidence of the plaintiff’s failure to wear nail 
polish (or, if the plaintiff is a man, his using nail polish) to show that her sex 
played a role in the adverse employment action of which she complains, and, 
on the other hand, creating a subtype of sexual discrimination called “sex 
stereotyping,” as if there were a federally protected right for male workers to 
wear nail polish and dresses and speak in falsetto and mince about in high 
heels, or for female ditch diggers to strip to the waist in hot weather.  If a court 
of appeals requires lawyers presenting oral argument to wear conservative 
business dress, should a male lawyer have a legal right to argue in drag 
provided that the court does not believe that he is a homosexual, against whom 
it is free to discriminate?  That seems to me a very strange extension of the 
Hopkins case. 
Id. at 1067. 
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who violate discrete sex-specific grooming codes, and even potentially 
against those penalized because of the sex of their romantic partners.130
The fact that courts’ gender nonconformity decisions do not in practice 
lead to such prohibitions suggests that something other than traditional 
concerns with subordination and status blindness are at work.  The cases 
suggest that more complicated—and contested—value judgments about 
worthwhile and worthless expressions of gender identity are also playing 
a role in the decisions.  In other words, what appears on the surface to be 
a liberal antidiscrimination principle may in fact be perfectionism in 
drag. 
On one level, courts seem to be distinguishing between types of 
gender nonconforming behavior based on a guess about how important 
and integral the behavior is to the individual’s sense of gender 
identity.131  Mannerisms and behaviors are given more protection than 
clothing and hair choices—particularly when courts deem the latter to be 
idiosyncratic expressions of personal preference rather than concerted 
efforts to express a core gender identity.  Courts routinely deny 
antidiscrimination protection to men seeking to wear long hair or 
earrings where the behavior is not part of an overall effort to project a 
female gender identity.132  Similarly the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
recently rejected a woman’s claim that her employer discriminated by 
 130. Several scholars have made this point.  See Case, supra note 119, at 7 (arguing 
that discrimination against cross-dressing men is a form of sex discrimination); Stephen 
Clark, Same-Sex But Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 
107, 120-38 (2002) (assessing and defending the argument that discrimination against 
gays and lesbians is a form of sex discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The 
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Laws as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988) 
(arguing that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination). 
 131. Robert Post has made a similar suggestion.  He notes: “It seems to be 
important that grooming and dress codes regulate voluntary behavior, for courts tend to 
conceptualize employees who present themselves in ways that violate established gender 
grooming and dress conventions as asserting a ‘personal preference’ to flout accepted 
standards.”  ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 45 (2001). 
 132. See, e.g., Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908-09 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that it did not violate Title VII for an employer to require male 
employees to have short hair but imposing no similar restriction on female employees); 
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1087-88 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that company policy prohibiting long hair for male employees but not for female 
employees did not violate Title VII); Lockhart v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 
604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that it did not constitute sex discrimination under 
Oregon law for an employer to fire a man for wearing an earring when female employees 
were permitted to do the same thing). 




“requiring” that women, but not men, wear makeup.133  In upholding the 
employer’s makeup requirement, the court minimized the plaintiff’s 
interest in not wearing makeup and emphasized that sex-specific 
grooming requirements did not become illegal simply because they were 
“personally offensive” to the plaintiff.134  Behavioral expressions of one’s 
core gender identity, in contrast, are deemed more important and worthy 
of protection than expressions of personal taste or preference regarding 
one’s own comfort or aesthetic.135  It seems unlikely that this distinction 
is just about the perceived mutability of the trait at issue.  It is not at all 
clear that effeminate mannerisms in men or masculine mannerisms in 
women are immutable.  Certainly the partners in Price Waterhouse did 
not believe Hopkins’ masculine mannerisms were immutable given the 
detailed instructions they gave her about how to change her behavior.  
The distinction seems to rely on a more fundamental sense of the trait’s 
importance to the holder and the court’s degree of respect for that 
connection.  Given this hierarchy, it is not surprising that the first two 
cases in which courts have provided antidiscrimination protection to 
male cross-dressers have involved preoperative transsexuals for whom 
the cross-dressing was integral to their expression of what they 
understood to be their authentic gender identity.136
 133. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 134. See id. at 1112.  The court explained: 
We respect Jespersen’s resolve to be true to herself and to the image that she 
wishes to project to the world.  We cannot agree, however, that her objection 
to the makeup requirement, without more, can give rise to a claim of sex 
stereotyping under Title VII.  If we were to do so, we would come perilously 
close to holding that every grooming, apparel, or appearance requirement that 
an individual finds personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-
image, can create a triable issue of sex discrimination. 
Id. 
 135. Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati, and Gowri Ramachandran offer a similar 
explanation for courts’ protection of effeminate men, namely that such protection is an 
attempt by courts to recognize and protect expressions of sexual orientation through a 
back door.  The authors contend: 
Because sexual orientation qua sexual orientation cannot be employed to 
support a claim of discrimination, the courts grounded their finding of 
discrimination on the Price Waterhouse theory of sex stereotyping. . . . Quite 
possibly, they were engaging in subversive judging—enacting a minor 
rebellion against the Congressional refusal to provide any protection against 
sexual orientation discrimination. 
Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, Makeup and Women at Work, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
873881, at *36-37. 
 136. See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733-38 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding a sex discrimination jury verdict in favor of a male-to-female preoperative 
transsexual denied a promotion to police sergeant for failure to conform to masculine sex 
stereotypes, including coming to work wearing makeup and a French manicure); Smith 
v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff—a 
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On another level, however, these decisions seem to reflect a sense—
albeit unstable and nonuniform—about how valuable or harmful certain 
manifestations of gender identity are to the individual.  In other words, 
courts seem to distinguish gender bending behaviors based on the courts’ 
own view of the worth(lessness) of the behavior involved. 
It is difficult to explain courts’ newly divergent treatment of cross-
dressing by transsexual men independent of the courts’ own views about 
the inherent value of such behavior.  The fact that some courts treat 
cross-dressing by transsexuals as a kind of sickness not warranting 
antidiscrimination protection, while other more recent courts treat it as 
a protected form of gender expression, suggests that only a changing 
perception of the worth of the activity is driving the antidiscrimination 
demands in these cases.  The decision about whether to require society to 
accommodate cross-dressing transsexuals, or to require such individuals to 
conform to traditional norms, seems necessarily to reflect courts’ 
divergent views about whether the behavior at issue is within the range 
of normal or is instead morally repulsive and diseased.137
Certainly antisubordination concerns justify some protections of 
gender nonconforming behavior.  Women would have been significantly 
impaired in their ability to fully integrate into the workplace if the 
Supreme Court had not delegitimized the aggressive woman/bitchy 
woman equivalence in Price Waterhouse.  Moreover, a rich conception 
of sex-blind equality would call for even broader protection of gender 
preoperative male-to-female transsexual diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder—who 
was discriminated against after he began “to express a more feminine appearance and 
manner on a regular basis, including at work,” could state a claim for sex discrimination 
using the sex stereotyping theory from Price Waterhouse). 
 137. Treating transsexualism as a kind of disease does not then lead to protection 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act because that Act explicitly excludes 
“transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments” 
from the Act’s definition of disability.  Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC            
§ 12211 (2000).  A similar kind of normative flux may also explain courts’ treatment of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Although courts generally hold that 
discrimination based on sexual orientation is not protected by Title VII, two district 
courts have interpreted Price Waterhouse as providing protection for individuals 
harassed because of their sexual orientation.  See Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country 
Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D. Or. 2002) (“A jury could find that [plaintiff’s 
supervisor] would not have acted as she (allegedly) did if Plaintiff were a man dating a 
woman, instead of a woman dating a woman.  If that is so, then Plaintiff was 
discriminated against because of her gender.”); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 
410 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff harassed because of his actual or perceived 
sexual orientation, but otherwise “stereotypically masculine in every way,” could 
maintain a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment). 
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bending behavior.  Yet neither traditional antidiscrimination mandate 
explains the odd way in which courts in fact distinguish between those 
gender bending activities that fall within the zone of protection and those 
that do not.  Ultimately, the cases reflect a quite uniform judicial sense 
that, as a general matter, expressions of gender identity are somehow 
more important and deserving of protection than more transient kinds of 
personal preferences as well as an inconsistent and unstable judicial 
sense about the particular kinds of gender identity that nonetheless 
remain unworthy of protection. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Certainly most antidiscrimination demands are consistent with 
standard liberal principles requiring that like must be treated alike and 
that caste-based hierarchies must be, whenever possible, dismantled.  
Moreover, some antidiscrimination demands are consistent with both 
standard liberal principles and perfectionist ideals.  The Supreme Court’s 
holding in Price Waterhouse, for example—requiring a disconnect 
between aggressiveness and bitchiness in women—is consistent with 
both a perfectionist commitment to promoting rationality and self-
determination and an antisubordination commitment to including more 
women in the upper echelons of the work world.  I have focused in this 
paper, however, on areas of sex discrimination law that cannot be fully 
explained without relying on underlying perfectionist principles. 
The perfectionism that has emerged parallels in core respects those of 
the contemporary theorists discussed at the paper’s start.  Courts’ 
antidiscrimination decisions reflect a belief in the importance of 
intellectual and cognitive development and also a belief in the importance 
of certain valued forms of noncommodified sexual expression and 
autonomy.  Courts go to considerable lengths to maintain at least a 
portion of the work world in which women and men will be valued as 
intellectual and rational agents, rather than as sexual objects, and where 
their expressions of gender identity will, to an increasingly large degree, 
be protected.  Likewise, courts go to considerable lengths to allow 
individuals to protect their personal and sexual identities from forced 
market participation and exposure.   
Again, my claim is not that antidiscrimination law always and 
invariably operates on judicial perfectionist ideals.  Rather, my claim is 
that antidiscrimination law cannot be fully understood as operating 
wholly independently of such ideals.  I have focused in this paper on 
those areas of law in which standard equality and antisubordination 
arguments are at their most indeterminate and incoherent.  It is in these 
areas that the role of perfectionism is most clear.  The cases reveal that, 
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in practice, antidiscrimination law relies not only on explicit judgments 
about what social groups are entitled to full membership but also on 
implicit judgments about what kinds of individuals within those groups 
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